Microsoft Malware Protection Center

Since mid-April 2024, Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed the threat actor Storm-1811 misusing the client management tool Quick Assist to target users in social engineering attacks. Storm-1811 is a financially motivated cybercriminal group known to deploy Black Basta ransomware. The observed activity begins with impersonation through voice phishing (vishing), followed by delivery of malicious tools, including remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools like ScreenConnect and NetSupport Manager, malware like Qakbot, Cobalt Strike, and ultimately Black Basta ransomware.

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Quick Assist is an application that enables a user to share their Windows or macOS device with another person over a remote connection. This enables the connecting user to remotely connect to the receiving user’s device and view its display, make annotations, or take full control, typically for troubleshooting. Threat actors misuse Quick Assist features to perform social engineering attacks by pretending, for example, to be a trusted contact like Microsoft technical support or an IT professional from the target user’s company to gain initial access to a target device.

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In addition to protecting customers from observed malicious activity, Microsoft is investigating the use of Quick Assist in these attacks and is working on improving the transparency and trust between helpers and sharers, and incorporating warning messages in Quick Assist to alert users about possible tech support scams. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects components of activity originating from Quick Assist sessions as well as follow-on activity, and Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the malware components associated with this activity.

TECH SUPPORT SCAMS

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Organizations can also reduce the risk of attacks by blocking or uninstalling Quick Assist and other remote management tools if the tools are not in use in their environment. Quick Assist is installed by default on devices running Windows 11. Additionally, tech support scams are an industry-wide issue where scammers use scare tactics to trick users into unnecessary technical support services. Educating users on how to recognize such scams can significantly reduce the impact of social engineering attacks. 

Social engineering

One of the social engineering techniques used by threat actors to obtain initial access to target devices using Quick Assist is through vishing attacks. Vishing attacks are a form of social engineering that involves callers luring targets into revealing sensitive information under false pretenses or tricking targets into carrying out actions on behalf of the caller.

For example, threat actors might attempt to impersonate IT or help desk personnel, pretending to conduct generic fixes on a device. In other cases, threat actors initiate link listing attacks – a type of email bombing attack, where threat actors sign up targeted emails to multiple email subscription services to flood email addresses indirectly with subscribed content. Following the email flood, the threat actor impersonates IT support through phone calls to the target user, claiming to offer assistance in remediating the spam issue.

During the call, the threat actor persuades the user to grant them access to their device through Quick Assist. The target user only needs to press CTRL + Windows + Q and enter the security code provided by the threat actor, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 1. Quick Assist prompt to enter security code

After the target enters the security code, they receive a dialog box asking for permission to allow screen sharing. Selecting Allow shares the user’s screen with the actor.

Figure 2. Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow screen sharing

Once in the session, the threat actor can select Request Control, which if approved by the target, grants the actor full control of the target’s device.

Figure 3. Quick Assist dialog box asking permission to allow control Follow-on activity leading to Black Basta ransomware

Once the user allows access and control, the threat actor runs a scripted cURL command to download a series of batch files or ZIP files used to deliver malicious payloads. Some of the batch scripts observed reference installing fake spam filter updates requiring the targets to provide sign-in credentials. In several cases, Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified such activity leading to the download of Qakbot, RMM tools like ScreenConnect and NetSupport Manager, and Cobalt Strike.

Figure 4. Examples of cURL commands to download batch files and ZIP files

Qakbot has been used over the years as a remote access vector to deliver additional malicious payloads that led to ransomware deployment. In this recent activity, Qakbot was used to deliver a Cobalt Strike Beacon attributed to Storm-1811.

ScreenConnect was used to establish persistence and conduct lateral movement within the compromised environment. NetSupport Manager is a remote access tool used by multiple threat actors to maintain control over compromised devices. An attacker might use this tool to remotely access the device, download and install additional malware, and launch arbitrary commands.

The mentioned RMM tools are commonly used by threat actors because of their extensive capabilities and ability to blend in with the environment. In some cases, the actors leveraged the OpenSSH tunneling tool to establish a secure shell (SSH) tunnel for persistence. 

After the threat actor installs the initial tooling and the phone call is concluded, Storm-1811 leverages their access and performs further hands-on-keyboard activities such as domain enumeration and lateral movement. Storm-1811 then uses PsExec to deploy Black Basta ransomware throughout the network.

Black Basta is a closed ransomware offering (exclusive and not openly marketed like ransomware as a service) distributed by a small number of threat actors who typically rely on other threat actors for initial access, malicious infrastructure, and malware development. Since Black Basta first appeared in April 2022, Black Basta attackers have deployed the ransomware after receiving access from Qakbot and other malware distributors, highlighting the need for organizations to focus on attack stages prior to ransomware deployment to reduce the threat. In the next sections, we share recommendations for improving defenses against this threat, including best practices when using Quick Assist and mitigations for reducing the impact of Black Basta and other ransomware.

Recommendations

Microsoft recommends the following best practices to protect users and organizations from attacks and threat actors that misuse Quick Assist:

• Consider blocking or uninstalling Quick Assist and other remote monitoring and management tools if these tools are not in use in your environment. If your organization utilizes another remote support tool such as Remote Help, block or remove Quick Assist as a best practice. Remote Help is part of the Microsoft Intune Suite and provides authentication and security controls for helpdesk connections.
• Educate users about protecting themselves from tech support scams. Tech support scams are an industry-wide issue where scammers use scary tactics to trick users into unnecessary technical support services.
• Only allow a helper to connect to your device using Quick Assist if you initiated the interaction by contacting Microsoft Support or your IT support staff directly. Don’t provide access to anyone claiming to have an urgent need to access your device.
• If you suspect that the person connecting to your device is conducting malicious activity, disconnect from the session immediately and report to your local authorities and/or any relevant IT members within your organization.
• Users who have been affected by a tech support scam can also use the Microsoft technical support scam form to report it.

Microsoft recommends the following mitigations to reduce the impact of this threat:

• Educate users about protecting personal and business information in social media, filtering unsolicited communication, identifying lure links in phishing emails, and reporting reconnaissance attempts and other suspicious activity.
• Educate users about preventing malware infections, such as ignoring or deleting unsolicited and unexpected emails or attachments sent through instant messaging applications or social networks as well as suspicious phone calls.
• Invest in advanced anti-phishing solutions that monitor incoming emails and visited websites. Microsoft Defender for Office 365 brings together incident and alert management across email, devices, and identities, centralizing investigations for email-based threats.
• Turn on cloud-delivered protection in Microsoft Defender Antivirus or the equivalent for your antivirus product to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block a huge majority of new and unknown variants.
• Enable network protection to prevent applications or users from accessing malicious domains and other malicious content on the internet.
• Turn on tamper protection features to prevent attackers from stopping security services.
• Enable investigation and remediation in full automated mode to allow Defender for Endpoint to take immediate action on alerts to resolve breaches, significantly reducing alert volume.
• Refer to Microsoft’s human-operated ransomware overview for general hardening recommendations against ransomware attacks.

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can turn on attack surface reduction rules to prevent common attack techniques:

• Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion
• Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts
• Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands
• Use advanced protection against ransomware

Detection details Microsoft Defender Antivirus 

Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects Qakbot downloaders, implants, and behavior as the following malware:

• TrojanDownloader:O97M/Qakbot
• Trojan:Win32/QBot
• Trojan:Win32/Qakbot
• TrojanSpy:Win32/Qakbot
• Behavior:Win32/Qakbot

Black Basta threat components are detected as the following:

• Behavior:Win32/Basta
• Ransom:Win32/Basta
• Trojan:Win32/Basta

Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects Beacon running on a victim process as the following:

• Behavior:Win32/CobaltStrike
• Backdoor:Win64/CobaltStrike
• HackTool:Win64/CobaltStrike

Additional Cobalt Strike components are detected as the following:

• TrojanDropper:PowerShell/Cobacis
• Trojan:Win64/TurtleLoader.CS
• Exploit:Win32/ShellCode.BN

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

Alerts with the following title in the security center can indicate threat activity on your network:

• Suspicious activity using Quick Assist

The following alerts might also indicate activity related to this threat. Note, however, that these alerts can also be triggered by unrelated threat activity.

• Suspicious curl behavior
• A file or network connection related to a ransomware-linked emerging threat activity group detected —This alert captures Storm-1811 activity
• Ransomware-linked emerging threat activity group Storm-0303 detected — This alert captures some Qakbot distributor activity
• Possible Qakbot activity
• Possible NetSupport Manager activity
• Possibly malicious use of proxy or tunneling tool
• Suspicious usage of remote management software
• Ongoing hands-on-keyboard attacker activity detected (Cobalt Strike)
• Human-operated attack using Cobalt Strike
• Ransomware behavior detected in the file system

Indicators of compromise

Domain names:

• upd7a[.]com
• upd7[.]com
• upd9[.]com
• upd5[.]pro

SHA-256:

• 71d50b74f81d27feefbc2bc0f631b0ed7fcdf88b1abbd6d104e66638993786f8
• 0f9156f91c387e7781603ed716dcdc3f5342ece96e155115708b1662b0f9b4d0
• 1ad05a4a849d7ed09e2efb38f5424523651baf3326b5f95e05f6726f564ccc30
• 93058bd5fe5f046e298e1d3655274ae4c08f07a8b6876e61629ae4a0b510a2f7
• 1cb1864314262e71de1565e198193877ef83e98823a7da81eb3d59894b5a4cfb

ScreenConnect relay:

• instance-olqdnn-relay.screenconnect[.]com

NetSupport C2:

• greekpool[.]com

Cobalt Strike Beacon C2:

• zziveastnews[.]com
• realsepnews[.]com

Advanced hunting  Microsoft Defender XDR

To locate possible malicious activity, run the following query in the Microsoft Defender portal:

This query looks for possible email bombing activity:

EmailEvents | where EmailDirection == "Inbound" | make-series Emailcount = count() on Timestamp step 1h by RecipientObjectId | extend (Anomalies, AnomalyScore, ExpectedEmails) = series_decompose_anomalies(Emailcount) | mv-expand Emailcount, Anomalies, AnomalyScore, ExpectedEmails to typeof(double), Timestamp | where Anomalies != 0 | where AnomalyScore >= 10 Microsoft Sentinel

Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with ‘TI map’) to automatically match the malicious domain indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace. If the TI Map analytics are not currently deployed, customers can install the Threat Intelligence solution from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub to have the analytics rule deployed in their Sentinel workspace.

Microsoft Sentinel also has a range of hunting queries available in Sentinel GitHub repo or as part of Sentinel solutions that customers can use to detect the activity detailed in this blog in addition to Microsoft Defender detections. These hunting queries include the following:

Qakbot:

• Qakbot hunting queries

Cobalt Strike:

• Cobalt Strike DNS Beaconing
• Potential ransomware activity related to Cobalt Strike
• Suspicious named pipes
• Cobalt Strike Invocation using WMI

References

• Defense and Mitigations from E-mail Bombing. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center

Learn more

For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog: https://aka.ms/threatintelblog.

To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/microsoft-threat-intelligence, and on X (formerly Twitter) at https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel.

To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast: https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/microsoft-threat-intelligence.

The post Threat actors misusing Quick Assist in social engineering attacks leading to ransomware appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

We are pleased to announce that Microsoft has been recognized as a Leader in the Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Security Information and Event Management (SIEM).1  We believe our position in the Leaders quadrant validates our vision and continued investments in Microsoft Sentinel making it a best-in-class, cloud-native SIEM solution. In addition, we are honored to be recognized for our Completeness of Vision. We feel this reflects our deep commitment to listening and delivering on our customer’s security priorities, like the need to simplify operations, rapidly disrupt cyberthreats, and supercharge the security operations center (SOC). In a significant step, we have launched the unified security operations platform, a single experience across security information and event management (SIEM), extended detection and response (XDR), and Microsoft Copilot for Security.

Are you a regular user of Microsoft Sentinel? Review your experience on Gartner Peer Insights™ and get a $25 gift card. 

Microsoft Sentinel is enriched by AI, automation, and Microsoft’s deep understanding of the threat landscape, empowering defenders to hunt and resolve critical threats at machine speed. Our comprehensive solution works seamlessly across multiple clouds, platforms, and security stacks offering many out-of-the-box connectors and customizable content to effectively protect the entire digital estate at scale. Leveraging our capabilities, customers have seen up to 234% return on investment (ROI) over a three-year period and have reduced costs as much as 44% by discontinuing legacy SIEM solutions.2 

Microsoft is on a mission to modernize security operations, enabling analysts to act swiftly and more efficiently with a robust, cost-optimized, and intuitive solution.

Microsoft Sentinel

Build next-generation security operations powered by the cloud and AI.

Transforming Security Operations 

Tens of thousands of customers trust Microsoft Sentinel to accelerate protection of their organizations with a simplified, scalable, and comprehensive approach. Over the last year, our engineering team has been hard at work delivering new innovations in several key areas, including:    

• A comprehensive and unified security operations platform: The platform blends the best of SIEM, XDR, AI, Threat Intelligence, and extended posture management into a single experience offering end-to-end protection by consolidating various security operations tools into a single, coherent experience, powered by generative AI. In the unified security operations platform, features are unified across Microsoft Sentinel and Microsoft Defender XDR, with embedded Copilot for Security, to deliver more comprehensive protection, speeding up time to respond and reducing the workload on analysts. 

• Robust out-of-the-box content: To effectively protect all clouds and platforms, Microsoft Sentinel offers pre-built content and solution packages that can be customized enabling detection, response, and defensive capabilities in the SOC. Over the last few months, we have enhanced our multicloud data collection (AWS and GCP), updated codeless connectors, expanded data coverage to more third-party sources, and extended protection to various critical business applications (SAP, Microsoft Dynamics 365, and Power Platform) among many more innovations. 

• Splunk SIEM migration tool: We announced the general availability of the new SIEM Migration tool to simplify and accelerate SIEM migrations to Microsoft with automated assistance. Today, the experience supports conversion of Splunk detections to Microsoft Sentinel analytics rules with more capabilities coming in the months ahead. 

• SOC efficiency: SOC optimization capability enables security teams to customize and manage their SIEM more efficiently for specific business and security requirements. With dynamic, research backed recommendations to optimize data usage, costs, and coverage against relevant threats, analysts can confidently identify opportunities to reduce costs, improve security posture, and see value more quickly. 

Copilot for Security

Learn more

• Copilot for Security: Copilot empowers security teams to make informed decisions in the SOC to protect at the speed and scale of AI. It offers skills to translate natural language to Kusto Query Language (KQL), accelerate incident investigation and response by automating manual tasks with customizable promptbooks, summarizes incidents with full context, helps prevent breaches with dynamic insights from Microsoft Threat Intelligence, and more. 

• Enhanced incident experience: The new incidents page experience provides more context for SOC analysts to efficiently triage, investigate, and respond quickly to incidents. Many new investigation, response, and incident management features offer the analysts the information and tools necessary to understand the incident and full scope of the breach while making navigation easy and context switching less frequent. New features include top insights, a new activity log for incident audits, a Log Analytics query window to investigate logs and more. 

Download the complimentary report to get more details on our positioning as a Leader. Our customers and partners have been an invaluable part of this multiyear journey. We owe our immense gratitude to you. 

Looking forward 

In 2024 we’ll continue to listen to customer needs and further enhance Microsoft Sentinel’s advanced threat-protection capabilities to empower defenders and drive efficiencies for SOC teams.  

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity

1Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Security Information and Event Management, Andrew Davies, Mitchell Schneider, Rustam Malik, Eric Ahlm, May 8 2024.

Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publications and does not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner’s Research & Advisory organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. 

Gartner Peer Insights content consists of the opinions of individual end users based on their own experiences with the vendors listed on the platform, should not be construed as statements of fact, nor do they represent the views of Gartner or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in this content nor makes any warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this content, about its accuracy or completeness, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. 

This graphic was published by Gartner, Inc. as part of a larger research document and should be evaluated in the context of the entire document. The Gartner document is available upon request from Microsoft. 

GARTNER is a registered trademark and service mark of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates in the U.S. and internationally, Magic Quadrant is a registered trademark of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates and is used herein with permission. All rights reserved. 

2The Total Economic Impact™ of Microsoft Sentinel, a commissioned study conducted by Forrester Consulting on behalf of Microsoft. Results are for a composite organization based on interviewed customers. 

The post Microsoft is again named a Leader in the 2024 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Security Information and Event Management​​ appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

The identity security landscape is transforming rapidly. Every digital experience and interaction is an opportunity for people to connect, share, and collaborate. But first, we need to know we can trust those digital experiences and interactions. Customers note a massive rise in the sheer number of identities they need to enable, connect, and protect. These include not only human identities like employees, partners, and customers, but also non-human or machine identities—which outnumber humans and continue to grow exponentially. All these identities come with unique risks, but they’re central to business organizations’ need to create effective, seamless connections—both for people and their apps, data, and networks.

At the same time, the number and complexity of cyberthreats continues to grow. This makes the challenge of securing human and non-human identities urgent and critical. Phishing, ransomware, and both internal and external threats have increased significantly. And threat actors are quickly exploiting newer technologies like generative AI to create and scale their attacks.

In the face of these challenges and the acceleration of AI opportunities and risks, what we think of as traditional identity and access management is no longer enough. We need to ensure the right people, machines, and software components get access to the right resources at the right time, while keeping out any bad actors or cyberthreats. We need to be able to secure access for any trustworthy identity, anywhere, to any app, resource, or AI tool at any time.

We take these challenges very seriously. Our teams have been hard at work, listening to customers and analyzing data—and utilizing the modern technologies enabled by AI—to stay ahead of threats and step up our defenses. This new era demands a comprehensive, adaptive, real-time approach to securing access.

At Microsoft, we call this approach the trust fabric.  

Think global, act local

In years past, the firewall was the clear perimeter of network protection for customers. Then the buzz was “identity is the new perimeter” as people began to work from home and do their work on personal devices. And recently, the term “identity fabric,” coined by industry analysts in 2023, has been used by many to describe identity and access management (IAM) concepts and capabilities. But the move from a network control plane to an identity-centric control plane is just the beginning. Flexible work models, cloud apps and services, digitized business processes, AI, and more can no longer be managed by a single identity control plane. It would slow down the speed of business and become a choke point.

Instead, to meet the needs of our ever-expanding digital estate, we need a “think global, act local” approach. A combination of centralized decisions and policies would determine what is allowed to happen at the edges—the points of interaction—with multiple, distributed control planes at both the identity and network levels. In addition to identity, the network and endpoints are equally critical signals. The controls and policies should be unified with identity to reduce complexity and gaps. This is the distinction between identity fabric and the next step: trust fabric. In this era of ubiquitous, decentralized computing, data centers can serve as the intelligent cloud, facilitating interaction with smart devices and services on the intelligent edge. This decentralized identity model can also help achieve the speed required to authorize so many devices and services at scale. The vision for how to conceptually architect and move forward with this comprehensive defense-in-depth cybersecurity strategy is the same as a trust fabric. As such, Microsoft’s trust fabric concept expands beyond traditional IAM to weave together comprehensive, unified identity, network access, and endpoint controls.

Figure 1. Identity security has evolved from directory services and firewalls to cloud-centered identity services to today’s decentralized trust fabric approach. 

Zero Trust and a trust fabric

Zero Trust is the term for an evolving set of cybersecurity paradigms that move cybersecurity defenses from static, network-based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources. The concept of Zero Trust has been around in cybersecurity for some time and is increasingly important as enterprise infrastructure continues to become decentralized and increases in complexity. In 2020, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released a security-wide framework or model of Zero Trust based on three core principles: Verify explicitly, ensure least-privileged access, and assume breach. The Zero Trust principles are foundational to how organizations should architect a trust fabric, and instructional for how to build technology to bring the trust fabric to life.

A Zero Trust strategy is a proactive, integrated approach to security across all layers of the digital estate. A modern comprehensive implementation of Zero Trust protects assets wherever they are. It includes solutions for securing access, securing your data, securing all your clouds, defending against threats, and managing risk and privacy. Zero Trust benefits from AI-enabled solutions and provides the agile security required to protect the use of AI technologies. Developing and managing a trust fabric for your organization addresses the need for secure access. It can integrate with and inform each solution in your framework as needed for end-to-end visibility, defense, and optimization.     

The core threads of a trust fabric

The first key word is trust. Trustworthiness of human and non-human identities will be determined by real-time evaluation and verification of valid decentralized identity credentials. It isn’t an idea of “trust but verify.” It’s “actively verify, then trust.” And the second key word is fabric. A fabric is a cybersecurity mesh architecture—a composable and scalable approach to extending security controls, even to widely distributed assets.1 With a trust fabric, organizations first evaluate the risk level of any identity or action. Then, they apply a universal Conditional Access engine. It meters secure access with smart policies and decisions informed by governance, compliance, and current global cyberthreats. And it takes into account any important factors or anomalies relevant to the situation at any given moment.  

Figure 2. A trust fabric verifies identities, validates access conditions, checks permissions, encrypts the connection channel, and monitors for compromise.

For a trust fabric, the following capabilities and conditions must be continuously evaluated in real-time:   

• Verify the initiating identity is trustworthy, secure, and verified, as well as the resource, person, or AI they’re connecting with.    
• Protect the communication channel that transports data. 
• Ensure access extends no further than needed. 
• Sever the connection the moment fraud or risk is detected. 

The Microsoft trust fabric

At Microsoft, we continue to design and innovate our identity, endpoint, and network access portfolio to make the trust fabric a reality for our customers, today and tomorrow. Microsoft Entra helps our customers create their trust fabric for the era of AI that securely connects any trustworthy identity with anything, anywhere. 

Figure 3. Microsoft Entra is a comprehensive identity and network access solution for securing access for any trustworthy identity to any resource from anywhere.

It’s likely that your organization is already on the journey to create your own trust fabric. To be sure you’ve got the basics covered, we’ve documented the top “quick security wins” in our Microsoft Entra Fundamentals documentation on Microsoft Learn: 

• Enable multifactor authentication.
• Identity secure score.
• Improve your security posture.
• Integrating all your apps with Microsoft Entra ID.
• Security defaults.
• Block less secure authentications.

As organizations learn more about trust fabric and continue to apply Zero Trust principles, we’ll be sharing more of our perspective. Keep an eye out for my next blog, focusing on the four stages of trust fabric maturity and how to assess and plan for each stage.

Microsoft Entra

Protect any identity and secure access to any resource with a family of multicloud identity and network access solutions.

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To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

1Cybersecurity Mesh, Gartner.

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At this year’s Microsoft Security Excellence Awards, we took a journey through the evolution of cybersecurity from the 1950s to today. While this event theme celebrated the significant technological advancements that have shaped each decade, the main focus was on the Microsoft Intelligent Security Association (MISA) member finalists and winners whose innovations in cybersecurity have earned them well-deserved recognition.

Alongside applauding our partners’ achievements, we highlighted the transformative impact of AI in security. AI is the defining technology of our time, revolutionizing how we anticipate, prevent, and respond to threats. MISA—a coalition of Microsoft leaders and subject matter experts, independent software vendors (ISVs), and managed security service providers (MSSPs)—and its members play a pivotal role in driving this evolution, ensuring a safer digital future for everyone.

Together, we work to defend organizations around the world from increasing cyberthreats. In San Francisco, California, on May 6, 2024, the first day of RSA Conference 2024 (RSAC), we were honored to bring together MISA members and Microsoft Security leadership to honor the top finalists and announce award winners.

“I’m so pleased to congratulate this year’s Microsoft Security Excellence awards recipients and to acknowledge all those who were nominated,” said Vasu Jakkal, Corporate Vice President, Microsoft Security Business. “Our partner community plays such an important role in helping our customers navigate a rapidly evolving cybersecurity landscape. Each of this year’s recipients demonstrates true innovation and an inspiring dedication to the mission of security. We are so proud to work alongside them in a shared commitment to building a safer world for everyone.”

Celebrating innovation and impact

This year we streamlined the award categories to spotlight the achievements that not only redefine our industry but also significantly advance our collective mission towards a more secure and efficient digital future.

We also introduced a new award category: the Endpoint Management Trailblazer, which celebrates partners’ contributions to modernizing endpoint and device management. As the landscape of cyberthreats continues to evolve, the security perimeter of organizations extends beyond traditional boundaries, making endpoint management more critical than ever.

What is an endpoint?

Learn more

Effective endpoint and device management ensures that every device connected to an organization’s network is continuously monitored and secured, reducing the risk of breaches. This not only includes safeguarding the devices themselves but also involves managing access to networks and data in a way that keeps up with the dynamic nature of cyberthreats.

By spotlighting our partners who excel in this area, we aim to underscore the importance of adopting forward-thinking security measures that align with the modern workplace’s needs, ultimately fostering a safer and more resilient digital environment for businesses and their stakeholders.

Meet the leaders behind this year’s awards

Executives from across Microsoft came together to recognize and celebrate all the award winner finalists and winners, including:

Security Trailblazer: Alym Rayani, Vice President Security GTM.

Compliance and Privacy Trailblazer: Herain Oberoi, General Manager, Data Security, Governance, Compliance, and Privacy.

Identity Trailblazer: Irina Nechaeva, General Manager, Identity and Network Access; and Morgan Webb, Principle Group Manager, Security Customer Experience Engineering.

Endpoint Management Trailblazer: Dilip Radhakrishnan, General Manager, Microsoft Intune.

Security Customer Champion: Jeffrey York, Vice President, Security Partner Investments and Incentives.

Security Changemaker: Ann Choi, General Manager, Commercial Cloud Partner Strategy.

Diversity in Security: Tara Knapp, Director, Security Business Development; and Tara Ragan, Channel Strategy and Operations Manager, Lighthouse.

Security MSSP of the Year: Vasu Jakkal, Corporate Vice President, Microsoft Security Business.

Security ISV of the Year: Vasu Jakkal, Corporate Vice President, Microsoft Security Business.

2024 Security Excellence Award winners

In line with this year’s theme focused on the evolution of cybersecurity, we’re proud to spotlight the key role of innovative technology and dedicated individuals in shaping a more secure future. After receiving many impressive award nominations, our review panel shortlisted five nominees for each category, with winners determined by votes from Microsoft and MISA members. The finalists and winners in each category are:

Security Trailblazer 

Partners that have delivered innovative solutions or services that leverage the full Microsoft range of security products and have proven to be outstanding leaders in accelerating customers’ efforts to mitigate cybersecurity threats.

• Bulletproof—Winner
• Atech Cloud
• BlueVoyant
• Kovrr
• Performanta

Compliance and Privacy Trailblazer

Partners that deliver innovative solutions or services and are distinguished leaders in driving holistic or end-to-end Microsoft compliance or privacy strategy with customers.

• Lighthouse—Winner
• archTIS
• Infotechtion
• PwC
• Secude

Identity Trailblazer

Partners that are leaders in the identity space, have driven identity-related initiatives, and delivered innovative solutions or services with Microsoft Entra ID.

• Thales—Winner
• InSpark
• Oxford Computer Group
• Valence Security
• Wipro

Endpoint Management Trailblazer

Partners that have proven expertise in helping customers modernize their endpoint and device management posture while enabling organizations to reduce costs.

• water IT Security—Winner
• CGI
• Insight
• Senserva
• Synergy Advisors

Security Customer Champion

Partners that go above and beyond to drive customer impact and that have a proven track record of customer obsession and success.

• Ascent Solutions—Winner
• Protiviti
• PwC
• Quorum Cyber
• Tanium

Security Changemaker

Individuals within partner organizations who have made a remarkable security contribution to the company or the larger security community.

• Anna Webb, Kocho—Winner
• Adrianna Chen, D3 Security
• Ricardo Nicolini, Bulletproof
• Scott Edwards, Summit 7
• Tom Boltman, Kovrr

Diversity in Security

Partners that have demonstrated a significant commitment to enhancing diversity, equity, and inclusion to better serve security customers and foster change in the industry.

• Avanade—Winner
• Check Point
• CyberProof a UST Company
• Entrust
• Eviden

Security MSSP of the Year  

MSSPs that are all-around powerhouses with strong integration between Microsoft products and ongoing managed security services that drive the end-to-end Microsoft Security stack to our mutual customers.       

• Wortell—Winner
• Difenda
• glueckkanja AG
• Quorum Cyber
• Transparity

Security ISV of the Year

ISVs that are all-around powerhouses, show growth potential, and have innovative security solutions that integrate with a MISA-qualifying security product.

• ContraForce—Winner
• Kovrr
• Netskope
• Senserva
• Silverfort

We’re ready for what’s next 

This was an amazing evening, bringing together MISA members, Microsoft executives, and future security experts. Many thanks to all who came, and congratulations again to all our finalists and winners. One constant within the ever-changing world of cybersecurity is the way our community comes together to protect and empower customers. We look forward to seeing everything you accomplish in the upcoming year. 

If you’re at RSA Conference May 6-9, 2024, come and visit us at the Microsoft Booth 6044 North Expo where MISA members will be showcasing their solutions at our MISA demo station and the Microsoft Theater. We’d love to see you at the following Theater sessions: 

• ContraForce and Bulletproof—Hyperautomation for SecOps Service Management. Tuesday, May 7, 2024, 5:00 PM PT to 5:20 PM PT.
• glueckkanja AG—Use Microsoft Copilot for Security to bring context to your incidents. Tuesday, May 7, 2024, 5:30 PM PT to 5:50 PM PT.  
• Kovrr—The need for Shift Up Strategy: Financially Quantifying C-Suite Cyber Risk Management Decisions. Wednesday, May 8, 2024, 5:00 PM PT to 5:20 PM PT. 
• Darktrace—Combining the power of Darktrace & Microsoft Copilot for Security to Empower the Modern SOC. Wednesday, May 8, 2024, 5:30 PM PT to 5:50 PM PT.
• Avanade—Real world stories of using Microsoft Purview Data Protection to enable responsible adoption of Copilot for Microsoft 365. ​Thursday May 9, 2024, 10:30 AM PT to 10:50 AM PT. 

Learn more

Learn more about the Microsoft Intelligent Security Association.

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

The post Microsoft announces the 2024 Microsoft Security Excellence Awards winners appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

AI is transforming our world, unlocking new possibilities to enhance human abilities and to extend opportunities globally. At the same time, we are also facing an unprecedented threat landscape with the speed, scale, and sophistication of attacks increasing rapidly. To meet these challenges, we must ensure that AI is built, deployed, and used responsibly with safety and security at its core. And it is more important than ever to leverage AI to empower all defenders and tilt the balance in their favor.

Security is our top priority at Microsoft—above all else—and our expanded Secure Future Initiative underscores our company-wide commitment to making the world a safer place for everyone. I am proud that Microsoft is prioritizing security in the age of AI as we continue to innovate with a security-first mindset. 

Today, new capabilities are now available in Microsoft Defender and Microsoft Purview to help organizations secure and govern generative AI applications at work. These releases deliver purpose-built policy tools and better visibility to help you secure and govern generative AI apps and their data. We are also delivering a new unified experience for the security analyst and integrating Microsoft Copilot for Security across our security product portfolio.  

You’ll be able to see firsthand these innovations and more across the Microsoft Security portfolio at RSA Conference (RSAC). I also hope you will also join me on Tuesday, May 7, 2024, for “Securing AI: What We’ve Learned and What Comes Next,” to explore the strategies that every organization can implement to securely design, deploy, and govern AI.

Secure your AI transformation with Microsoft Security

Wherever your organization is in your AI transformation, you will need comprehensive security controls to secure govern your AI applications and data throughout their lifecycle—development, deployment, and runtime.  

With the new capabilities announced today, Microsoft becomes the first security provider to deliver end-to-end AI security posture management, threat protection, data security, and governance for AI.

Discover new AI attack surfaces, strengthen your AI security posture, and protect AI apps against threats with Microsoft Defender for Cloud. Now security teams can identify their entire AI infrastructure—such as plugins, SDKs, and other AI technologies—with AI security posture management capabilities across platforms like Microsoft Azure OpenAI Service, Azure Machine Learning, and Amazon Bedrock. You can continuously identify risks, map attack paths, and use built-in security best practices to prevent direct and indirect attacks on AI applications, from development to runtime.

Integrated with Microsoft Azure AI services, including Microsoft Azure AI Content Safety and Azure OpenAI, Defender for Cloud will continuously monitor AI applications for anomalous activity, correlate findings, and enrich security alerts with supporting evidence. Defender for Cloud is the first cloud-native application protection platform (CNAPP) to deliver threat protection for AI workloads at runtime, providing security operations center (SOC) analysts with new detections that alert to malicious activity and active threats, such as jailbreak attacks, credential theft, and sensitive data leakage. Additionally, SOC analysts will be able facilitate incident response with native integration of these signals into Microsoft Defender XDR.

Identify and mitigate data security and data compliance risks with Microsoft Purview. Give your security teams greater visibility into and understanding of which AI applications are being used and how to help you safeguard your data effectively in the age of AI. The Microsoft Purview AI Hub, now in preview, delivers insights such as sensitive data shared with AI applications, total number of users interacting with AI apps and their associated risk level, and more. To prevent potential oversharing of sensitive data, new insights help organizations identify unlabeled files that Copilot references and prioritize mitigation of oversharing risks. Additionally, we are excited to announce the preview of non-compliant usage insights in the AI Hub to help customers discover potential AI interactions that violate enterprise and regulatory policies in areas like hate and discrimination, corporate sabotage, money laundering, and more.

Govern AI usage to comply with regulatory policies with new AI compliance assessments in Microsoft Purview. We understand how important it is to comply with regulations, and how complicated it can be when deploying new technology. Four new Compliance Manager assessment templates, now in preview, are available to help you assess, implement, and strengthen compliance with AI regulations and standards, including EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF, ISO/IEC 23894:2023, and ISO/IEC 42001. The new assessment insights will also be surfaced within the Purview AI Hub, providing recommended actions to support compliance as you onboard and deploy AI solutions.

Together we can help everyone pursue the benefits of AI, by thoughtfully addressing the new risks. The new capabilities in Microsoft Defender for Cloud and Microsoft Purview, which build on top of the innovations we shared at Microsoft Ignite 2023 and Microsoft Secure 2024, are important advancements in empowering security teams to discover, protect, and govern AI—whether you’re adopting software as a service (SaaS) AI solutions or building your own.

Read more about all of the new capabilities and features that help you secure and govern AI.

Strengthening end-to-end security with a unified security operations platform

We continue investing in our long-standing commitment to providing you with the most complete end-to-end protection for your entire digital estate. There is an immediate need for tool consolidation and AI to gain the speed and scale required to defend against these new digital threats. Microsoft integrates all of the foundational SOC tools—cloud-native security information and event management (SIEM), comprehensive native extended detection and response (XDR), unified security posture management, and generative AI—to deliver true end-to-end threat protection in a single platform, with a common data model, and a unified analyst experience.  

The new unified security operations platform experience, in preview, transforms the real-world analyst experience with a simple, approachable user experience that brings together all the security signals and threat intelligence currently stuck in other tools. Analysts will have more context at every stage, with helpful recommendations and suggestions for automation that make investigation and response easier than ever before. We are also introducing new features across Microsoft Sentinel and Defender XDR, including global search, custom detections, and automation rules.

We are also pleased to announce a number of additional new features and capabilities that will empower your security operations center (SOC) to work across Microsoft security products for stronger end-to-end security.

• Microsoft Security Exposure Management initiatives help your security team identify risky exposures and instances of insufficient implementation of essential security controls, to find opportunities for improvement.
• SOC analysts can now use insider risk information as part of their investigation in Microsoft Defender XDR.
• Microsoft Defender XDR expands to include native operational technology (OT) protection, enabling automatic correlation of OT threat signal into cross-workload incidents and the ability to manage OT and industrial control system vulnerabilities directly within Defender XDR.
• Expanded attack disruption in Microsoft Defender XDR, powered by AI, machine learning, and threat intelligence, will cover new attack scenarios like disabling malicious OAuth apps and will significantly broaden compromised user disruption, such as leaked credentials, stuffing, and guessing.
• Microsoft Sentinel launches SOC Optimizations to provide tailored guidance to help manage costs, increase the value of data ingested, and improve coverage against common attack techniques.

Expanded Microsoft Copilot for Security integrations

Randomized Controlled Trial for Microsoft Copilot for Security

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When it comes to supporting security teams and relieving complexity, Microsoft Copilot for Security offers a great advantage. Greater integration of Copilot across the Microsoft security portfolio and beyond provides richer embedded experiences and Copilot capabilities from familiar and trusted products. We are proud to announce new Microsoft Copilot for Security integrations, including Purview, new partner plugins, Azure Firewall, and Azure Web Application Firewall. These integrations provide your security teams with real-time guidance, deeper investigative insights, and expanded access to data from across your environment.  

Security for the era of AI

An end-to-end security platform will be a determining factor in every organization’s transformation and will play a critical role in the durability of AI-powered innovation. Organizations that focus on securing AI and invest in using AI to strengthen security will be the lasting leaders in their industries and markets. Microsoft is committed to empowering these industry and market leaders with security solutions that can help them achieve more. We bring together four critical advantages: large-scale data and threat intelligence; the most complete end-to-end platform; industry leading, responsible AI; and tools to help you secure and govern AI.

Microsoft Copilot for Security is generally available

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With the general availability of Copilot for Security, Microsoft has delivered on our promise to put industry-leading generative AI into the hands of IT and security professionals of all levels of experience. Now, with today’s release of new capabilities in Defender for Cloud and Microsoft Purview, we are also delivering on our commitment to empower IT and security teams with the tools they need to take advantage of AI safely, responsibly, and securely.

Lastly and importantly, security is a team sport. We look forward to working together with the industry and our partners on advancing cyber security for all. 

I do hope you’ll connect with us at RSAC this week, where we will be demonstrating our comprehensive security portfolio and how it helps you protect your environment from every angle to prepare for and confidently adopt and deploy AI. 

Learn more

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

The post New capabilities to help you secure your AI transformation appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Last November, we launched the Secure Future Initiative (SFI) to prepare for the increasing scale and high stakes of cyberattacks. SFI brings together every part of Microsoft to advance cybersecurity protection across our company and products.

Since then, the threat landscape has continued to rapidly evolve, and we have learned a lot. The recent findings by the Department of Homeland Security’s Cyber Safety Review Board (CSRB) regarding the Storm-0558 cyberattack from last July, and the Midnight Blizzard attack we reported in January, underscore the severity of the threats facing our company and our customers.

Microsoft plays a central role in the world’s digital ecosystem, and this comes with a critical responsibility to earn and maintain trust. We must and will do more.

We are making security our top priority at Microsoft, above all else—over all other features. We’re expanding the scope of SFI, integrating the recent recommendations from the CSRB as well as our learnings from Midnight Blizzard to ensure that our cybersecurity approach remains robust and adaptive to the evolving threat landscape.

We will mobilize the expanded SFI pillars and goals across Microsoft and this will be a dimension in our hiring decisions. In addition, we will instill accountability by basing part of the compensation of the company’s Senior Leadership Team on our progress in meeting our security plans and milestones.

Below are details to demonstrate the seriousness of our work and commitment.

Expansion of SFI approach and scope

We have evolved our security approach, and going forward our work will be guided by the following three security principles:

1. Secure by design: Security comes first when designing any product or service.
2. Secure by default: Security protections are enabled and enforced by default, require no extra effort, and are not optional.
3. Secure operations: Security controls and monitoring will continuously be improved to meet current and future threats.

We are further expanding our goals and actions aligned to six prioritized security pillars and providing visibility into the details of our execution:

1. Protect identities and secrets

Reduce the risk of unauthorized access by implementing and enforcing best-in-class standards across all identity and secrets infrastructure, and user and application authentication and authorization. As part of this, we are taking the following actions:

• Protect identity infrastructure signing and platform keys with rapid and automatic rotation with hardware storage and protection (for example, hardware security module (HSM) and confidential compute).
• Strengthen identity standards and drive their adoption through use of standard SDKs across 100% of applications.
• Ensure 100% of user accounts are protected with securely managed, phishing-resistant multifactor authentication.
• Ensure 100% of applications are protected with system-managed credentials (for example, Managed Identity and Managed Certificates).
• Ensure 100% of identity tokens are protected with stateful and durable validation.
• Adopt more fine-grained partitioning of identity signing keys and platform keys.
• Ensure identity and public key infrastructure (PKI) systems are ready for a post-quantum cryptography world.

2. Protect tenants and isolate production systems

Protect all Microsoft tenants and production environments using consistent, best-in-class security practices and strict isolation to minimize breadth of impact. As part of this, we are taking the following actions:

• Maintain the security posture and commercial relationships of tenants by removing all unused, aged, or legacy systems.
• Protect 100% of Microsoft, acquired, and employee-created tenants, commerce accounts, and tenant resources to the security best practice baselines.
• Manage 100% of Microsoft Entra ID applications to a high, consistent security bar.
• Eliminate 100% of identity lateral movement pivots between tenants, environments, and clouds.
• 100% of applications and users have continuous least-privilege access enforcement.
• Ensure only secure, managed, healthy devices will be granted access to Microsoft tenants.

3. Protect networks

Protect Microsoft production networks and implement network isolation of Microsoft and customer resources. As part of this, we are taking the following actions:

• Secure 100% of Microsoft production networks and systems connected to the networks by improving isolation, monitoring, inventory, and secure operations.
• Apply network isolation and microsegmentation to 100% of the Microsoft production environments, creating additional layers of defense against attackers.
• Enable customers to easily secure their networks and network isolate resources in the cloud.

4. Protect engineering systems

Protect software assets and continuously improve code security through governance of the software supply chain and engineering systems infrastructure. As part of this, we are taking the following actions:

• Build and maintain inventory for 100% of the software assets used to deploy and operate Microsoft products and services.
• 100% of access to source code and engineering systems infrastructure is secured through Zero Trust and least-privilege access policies.
• 100% of source code that deploys to Microsoft production environments is protected through security best practices.
• Secure development, build, test, and release environments with 100% standardized, governed pipelines and infrastructure isolation.
• Secure the software supply chain to protect Microsoft production environments.

5. Monitor and detect threats

Comprehensive coverage and automatic detection of threats to Microsoft production infrastructure and services. As part of this, we are taking the following actions:

• Maintain a current inventory across 100% of Microsoft production infrastructure and services.
• Retain 100% of security logs for at least two years and make six months of appropriate logs available to customers.
• 100% of security logs are accessible from a central data lake to enable efficient and effective security investigation and threat hunting.
• Automatically detect and respond rapidly to anomalous access, behaviors, and configurations across 100% of Microsoft production infrastructure and services.

6. Accelerate response and remediation

Prevent exploitation of vulnerabilities discovered by external and internal entities, through comprehensive and timely remediation. As part of this, we are taking the following actions:

• Reduce the Time to Mitigate for high-severity cloud security vulnerabilities with accelerated response.
• Increase transparency of mitigated cloud vulnerabilities through the adoption and release of Common Weakness Enumeration™ (CWE™), and Common Platform Enumeration™ (CPE™) industry standards for released high severity Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) affecting the cloud.
• Improve the accuracy, effectiveness, transparency, and velocity of public messaging and customer engagement.

These goals directly align to our learnings from the Midnight Blizzard incident as well as all four CSRB recommendations to Microsoft and all 12 recommendations to cloud service providers (CSPs), across the areas of security culture, cybersecurity best practices, auditing logging norms, digital identity standards and guidance, and transparency.

We are delivering on these goals through a new level of coordination with a new operating model that aligns leaders and teams to the six SFI pillars, in order to drive security holistically and break down traditional silos. The pillar leaders are working across engineering Executive Vice Presidents (EVPs) to drive integrated, cross-company engineering execution, doing this work in waves. These engineering waves involve teams across Microsoft Azure, Windows, Microsoft 365, and Security, with additional product teams integrating into the process weekly.

While there is much more to do, we’ve made progress in executing against SFI priorities. For example, we’ve implemented automatic enforcement of multifactor authentication by default across more than one million Microsoft Entra ID tenants within Microsoft, including tenants for development, testing, demos, and production. We have eliminated or reduced application targets by removing 730,000 apps to date across production and corporate tenants that were out-of-lifecycle or not meeting current SFI standards. We have expanded our logging to give customers deeper visibility. And we recently announced a significant shift on our response process: We are now publishing root cause data for Microsoft CVEs using the CWE™ industry standard.

Adhering to standards with paved paths systems

Paved paths are best practices from our learned experiences, drawing upon lessons such as how to optimize productivity of our software development and operations, how to achieve compliance (such as Software Bill of Materials, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, General Data Protection Regulation, and others), and how to eliminate entire categories of vulnerabilities and mitigate related risks. A paved path becomes a standard when adoption significantly improves the developer or operations experience or security, quality, or compliance.

With SFI, we are explicitly defining standards for each of the six security pillars, and adherence to these standards will be measured as objectives and key results (OKRs).

Driving continuous improvement

The Secure Future Initiative empowers all of Microsoft to implement the needed changes to deliver security first. Our company culture is based on a growth mindset that fosters an ethos of continuous improvement. We continually seek feedback and new perspectives to tune our approach and progress. We will take our learnings from security incidents, feed them back into our security standards, and operationalize these learnings as paved paths that can enable secure design and operations at scale.

Instituting new governance

We are also taking major steps to elevate security governance, including several organizational changes and additional oversight, controls, and reporting.

Microsoft is implementing a new security governance framework spearheaded by the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). This framework introduces a partnership between engineering teams and newly formed Deputy CISOs, collectively responsible for overseeing SFI, managing risks, and reporting progress directly to the Senior Leadership Team. Progress will be reviewed weekly with this executive forum and quarterly with our Board of Directors.

Finally, given the importance of threat intelligence, we are bringing the full breadth of nation-state actor and threat hunting capabilities into the CISO organization.

Instilling a security-first culture

Culture can only be reinforced through our daily behaviors. Security is a team sport and is best realized when organizational boundaries are overcome. The engineering EVPs, in close coordination with SFI pillar leaders, are holding broadscale weekly and monthly operational meetings that include all levels of management and senior individual contributors. These meetings work on detailed execution and continuous improvement of security in context with what we collectively deliver to customers. Through this process of bottom-to-top and end-to-end problem solving, security thinking is ingrained in our daily behaviors.  

Ultimately, Microsoft runs on trust and this trust must be earned and maintained. As a global provider of software, infrastructure, and cloud services, we feel a deep responsibility to do our part to keep the world safe and secure. Our promise is to continually improve and adapt to the evolving needs of cybersecurity. This is job number one for us.

The post Security above all else—expanding Microsoft’s Secure Future Initiative appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Ten years ago, Microsoft envisioned a bold future: a world free of passwords. Every year, we celebrate World Password Day by updating you on our progress toward eliminating passwords for good. Today, we’re announcing passkey support for Microsoft consumer accounts, the next step toward our vision of simple, safe access for everyone.

In 2015, when we introduced Windows Hello and Windows Hello for Business as secure ways to access Windows 10 without entering a password, our identity systems were detecting around 115 password attacks per second.1 Less than a decade later, that number has surged 3,378% to more than 4,000 password attacks per second.2 Password attacks are so popular because they still get results. It’s painfully clear that passwords are not sufficient for protecting our lives online. No matter how long and complicated you make your password, or how often you change it, it still presents a risk.

The good news is that we’ve made a lot of progress toward making passwords a relic of the past. For a while, you’ve been able to sign in to apps and websites using FIDO security keys, Windows Hello, or the Microsoft Authenticator app instead of a password. Since September 2021, you’ve not only been able to sign in to your Microsoft account without a password, but you’ve also been able to delete your password altogether.3 We’re almost there.

And now there’s an even better way to sign in to more places without passwords: passkeys.

The future of signing in

If you’re like many people, you probably still use passwords to sign in to most of your websites and apps, most likely from multiple devices. This can translate into hundreds of passwords to remember, unless you use a password manager. With passkeys, instead of creating, managing, remembering, and entering passwords, you access your digital accounts the same way you unlock your device—usually with your face, fingerprint, or device PIN. More and more apps and services are adding support for passkeys; you can already use them to sign in to the most popular ones. Passkeys are so much easier and more secure than passwords that we predict passkeys will replace passwords almost entirely (and we hope this happens soon).

Starting today, you can use a passkey to access your Microsoft account using your face, fingerprint, or device PIN on Windows, Google, and Apple platforms. Your passkey gives you quick and easy access to the Microsoft services you use every day, and it will do a much better job than your password of protecting your account from malicious attacks.

Easier and more secure than passwords

Think of how many times and places you sign in with a password every single day. Is it 10? 50? Not only is this a frustrating experience, it’s also an unreliable way to protect a digital account. Here’s why: When you enter a password to sign in to an account, you’re essentially sharing a secret with the website or app to prove that you should have access to the account. The problem is that anyone who gets a hold of this secret can gain access to your account, and if your password gets compromised and appears on the dark web, the repercussions can be serious.

To make your credentials stronger, an app or website might require you to make your password longer or more complex. But even if you follow all the best practices for creating “strong” passwords, it’s still a trivial exercise for hackers to guess, steal, or trick you into revealing them.

What is phishing?

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You may have experienced an attack yourself—you click on a link in an email that seems legitimate, which leads to a website that looks just like the one you’re used to, asking you to enter your credentials. But when you do, nothing happens, or you get an error message. By the time you notice that the URL in your browser address bar is different from the usual one, it’s too late. You’ve just been phished by a malicious website.

Many app and website providers understand that even complicated passwords aren’t good enough to protect your account, so they give you the choice to use two-step or multifactor authentication with approvals and codes sent to your phone, email, or an app. While traditional multifactor authentication can help protect your account, it’s not attacker-proof, and it creates another frustrating barrier between you and your content: all these access attempts, passwords, and codes on all your devices can really add up.

This is why we’re so enthusiastic about passkeys.

How passkeys work

Passkeys work differently than passwords. Instead of a single, vulnerable secret, passkey access uses two unique keys, known as a cryptographic key pair. One key is stored safely on your device, guarded by your biometrics or PIN. The other key stays with the app or website for which you create the passkey. You need both parts of the key pair to sign in, just as you need both your key and the bank’s key to get into your safety deposit box.

Because this key pair combination is unique, your passkey will only work on the website or app you created it for, so you can’t be tricked into signing in to a malicious look-alike website. This is why we say that passkeys are “phishing-resistant.”

Even better, all the goodness and strength of cryptographic authentication stays behind the scenes. All you have to do to sign in is use your device unlock gesture: look into your device camera, press your finger on a fingerprint reader, or enter your PIN. Neither your biometric information nor your PIN ever leaves your device and they never get shared with the site or service you’re signing in to. Passkeys can also sync between your devices, so if you lose or upgrade your device, your passkeys will be ready and waiting for you when you set up your new one.

The best part about passkeys is that you’ll never need to worry about creating, forgetting, or resetting passwords ever again.

Creating a passkey for your Microsoft account

Creating a passkey for your Microsoft account is easy. On the device where you want to create the passkey, follow this link, and choose the face, fingerprint, PIN, or security key option. Then follow the instructions on your device.

To learn more about creating passkeys for your Microsoft account, visit this guide.

Signing into your Microsoft account using a passkey

When you sign in to your Microsoft account, you can use your passkey by choosing Sign-in options and then selecting face, fingerprint, PIN, or security key. Your device will open a security window, and then you can use your passkey to sign in.

Figure 1. Signing in to your Microsoft account on mobile devices.

Today, you can use a passkey to sign in to Microsoft apps and websites, including Microsoft 365 and Copilot on desktop and mobile browsers. Support for signing into mobile versions of Microsoft applications using your passkey will follow in the coming weeks.

If you want to use passkeys to sign in to work-related apps and services, your admin can configure Microsoft Entra ID to accept passkeys hosted on a hardware security key or in the Microsoft Authenticator app installed on your mobile device.

In this era of AI, there’s unprecedented opportunity for creativity and productivity that empowers every person on the planet—including billions of Microsoft users who access services for work and life every day—to achieve more. Protecting and accessing your digital life doesn’t need to be a hassle, and you shouldn’t have to choose between simple access and safe access. Accessing your Microsoft account with a passkey lets you put the frustration of passwords and codes behind you, so you can focus on being creative and getting things done.

Happy World Password(less) Day!

Learn more

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

1Microsoft Password Guidance, Microsoft Identity Protection Team.

2Microsoft Entra expands into Security Service Edge and Azure AD becomes Microsoft Entra ID, Joy Chik. July 11, 2023.

3The passwordless future is here for your Microsoft account, Vasu Jakkal. September 15, 2021.

The post Microsoft introduces passkeys for consumer accounts appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

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Microsoft discovered a path traversal-affiliated vulnerability pattern in multiple popular Android applications that could enable a malicious application to overwrite files in the vulnerable application’s home directory. The implications of this vulnerability pattern include arbitrary code execution and token theft, depending on an application’s implementation. Arbitrary code execution can provide a threat actor with full control over an application’s behavior. Meanwhile, token theft can provide a threat actor with access to the user’s accounts and sensitive data.

We identified several vulnerable applications in the Google Play Store that represented over four billion installations. We anticipate that the vulnerability pattern could be found in other applications. We’re sharing this research so developers and publishers can check their apps for similar issues, fix as appropriate, and prevent introducing such vulnerabilities into new apps or releases.  As threats across all platforms continue to evolve, industry collaboration among security researchers, security vendors, and the broader security community is essential in improving security for all. Microsoft remains committed to working with the security community to share vulnerability discoveries and threat intelligence to protect users across platforms.

After discovering this issue, we identified several vulnerable applications. As part of our responsible disclosure policy, we notified application developers through Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) via Microsoft Security Vulnerability Research (MSVR) and worked with them to address the issue. We would like to thank the Xiaomi, Inc. and WPS Office security teams for investigating and fixing the issue. As of February 2024, fixes have been deployed for the aforementioned apps, and users are advised to keep their device and installed applications up to date.

Recognizing that more applications could be affected, we acted to increase developer awareness of the issue by collaborating with Google to publish an article on the Android Developers website, providing guidance in a high-visibility location to help developers avoid introducing this vulnerability pattern into their applications. We also wish to thank Google’s Android Application Security Research team for their partnership in resolving this issue.

In this blog post, we continue to raise developer and user awareness by giving a general overview of the vulnerability pattern, and then focusing on Android share targets, as they are the most prone to these types of attacks. We go through an actual code execution case study where we demonstrate impact that extends beyond the mobile device’s scope and could even affect a local network. Finally, we provide guidance to users and application developers and illustrate the importance of collaboration to improve security for all.

Overview: Data and file sharing on Android

The Android operating system enforces isolation by assigning each application its own dedicated data and memory space. To facilitate data and file sharing, Android provides a component called a content provider, which acts as an interface for managing and exposing data to the rest of the installed applications in a secure manner. When used correctly, a content provider provides a reliable solution. However, improper implementation can introduce vulnerabilities that could enable bypassing of read/write restrictions within an application’s home directory.

The Android software development kit (SDK) includes the FileProvider class, a subclass of ContentProvider that enables file sharing between installed applications. An application that needs to share its files with other applications can declare a FileProvider in its app manifest and declare the specific paths to share.

Every file provider has a property called authority, which identifies it system-wide, and can be used by the consumer (the app that wants to access the shared files) as a form of address. This content-based model bears a strong resemblance to the web model, but instead of the http scheme, consumers utilize the content scheme along with the authority, followed by a pseudo-path to the file that they want to access.

For example, assuming that the application com.example.server shares some files under the file:///data/data/com.example.server/files/images directory that it has previously declared as shared using the name shared_images, a consumer can use the content://[authority]/shared_images/[sub-path]/[filename] URI to index these files.

Access is given by the data sharing application most commonly using the grantUriPermissions attribute of the Android manifest, in combination with special flags that are used to define a read or write mode of operation. The data sharing application creates and sends an intent to the consumer that provides temporary fine-grained access to a file.  Finally, when a provider receives a file access request, it resolves the actual file path that corresponds to the incoming URI and returns a file descriptor to it.  

Implementation pitfalls

This content provider-based model provides a well-defined file-sharing mechanism, enabling a serving application to share its files with other applications in a secure manner with fine-grained control. However, we have frequently encountered cases where the consuming application doesn’t validate the content of the file that it receives and, most concerning, it uses the filename provided by the serving application to cache the received file within the consuming application’s internal data directory. If the serving application implements its own malicious version of FileProvider, it may be able to cause the consuming application to overwrite critical files.

Share targets

In simple terms, a share target is an Android app that declares itself to handle data and files sent by other apps. Common application categories that can be share targets include mail clients, social networking apps, messaging apps, file editors, browsers, and so on. In a common scenario, when a user clicks on a file, the Android operating system triggers the share-sheet dialog asking the user to select the component that the file should be sent to:

Figure 1. The Android share sheet dialog

While this type of guided file-sharing interaction itself may not trigger a successful attack against a share target, a malicious Android application can create a custom, explicit intent and send a file directly to a share target with a malicious filename and without the user’s knowledge or approval. Essentially, the malicious application is substituting its own malicious FileProvider implementation and provides a filename that is improperly trusted by the consuming application.

Figure 2. Dirty stream attack

In Figure 2, the malicious app, on the left, creates an explicit intent that targets the file processing component of the share target, on the right, and attaches a content URI as an intent’s extra. It then sends this intent to the share target using the startActivity API call.

After this point, most of the share targets that we have reviewed seem to follow a specific code pattern that includes the following steps:

1. Request the actual filename from the remote file provider
2. Use this filename to initialize a file that is subsequently used to initialize a file output stream
3. Create an input stream using the incoming content URI
4. Copy the input stream to the output stream

Since the rogue app controls the name as well as the content of the file, by blindly trusting this input, a share target may overwrite critical files in its private data space, which may lead to serious consequences.

Impact

We identified this vulnerability pattern in the then-current versions of several Android applications published on the Google Play Store, including at least four with more than 500 million installations each. In each case, we responsibly disclosed to the vendor. Two example vulnerable applications that we identified are Xiaomi Inc.’s File Manager (1B+ installs) and WPS Office (500M+ installs).

In Xiaomi Inc.’s File Manager, we were able to obtain arbitrary code execution in version V1-210567. After our disclosure, Xiaomi published version V1-210593, and we verified that the vulnerability has been addressed. In WPS Office, we were able to obtain arbitrary code execution in version 16.8.1. After our disclosure, WPS published and informed us that the vulnerability has been addressed as of version 17.0.0.

The potential impact varies depending on implementation specifics. For example, it’s very common for Android applications to read their server settings from the shared_prefs directory. In such cases, the malicious app can overwrite these settings, causing the vulnerable app to communicate with an attacker-controlled server and send the user’s authentication tokens or other sensitive information.

In a worst-case (and not so uncommon) scenario, the vulnerable application might load native libraries from its data directory (as opposed to the more secure /data/app-lib directory, where the libraries are protected from modification). In this case, the malicious application can overwrite a native library with malicious code that gets executed when the library is loaded. In the following section, we use Xiaomi Inc.’s File Manager to illustrate this case. We demonstrated the ability for a malicious application to overwrite the application’s shared preferences, write a native library to the application’s internal storage, and cause the application to load the library. These actions provided arbitrary code execution with the file manager’s user ID and permissions.

In the following sections, we focus on this case and delve into the technical details of this vulnerability pattern.

Case study: Xiaomi Inc.’s File Manager

Xiaomi Inc.’s File Manager is the default file manager application for Xiaomi devices and is published under the package name com.mi.android.globalFileexplorer on the Google Play Store, where it has been installed over one billion times.

Figure 3. Xiaomi’s File Manager profile according to Android rank (source: File Manager)

Besides having full access to the device’s external storage, the application requests many permissions, including the ability to install other applications:

Figure 4. A snapshot of the application’s permissions

Further, it offers a junk files cleaner plugin as well as the ability to connect to remote FTP and SMB shares:

Figure 5. Connecting to remote shares using the file manager Vulnerability assessment findings

During our investigation, we identified that the application exports the CopyFileActivity, an activity alias of the com.android.fileexplorer.activity.FileActivity, which is used to handle copy-from-to file operations:

Figure 6. Triggering the copy to CopyFileActivity

Since this activity is exported, it can be triggered by any application installed on the same device by using an explicit intent of action SEND or SEND_MULTIPLE and attaching a content URI corresponding to a file stream.

Upon receiving such an intent, the browser performs a validity check, which we found to be insufficient:

Figure 7. Validating an incoming copy file request

As depicted above, the initCopyOrMoveIntent method calls the checkValid method passing as an argument a content URI (steps 1 and 2). However, the checkValid method is designed to handle a file path, not a content URI. It always returns true for a content URI. Instead, a safer practice is to parse the string as a URI, including ensuring the scheme is the expected value (in this case, file, not content).The checkValid method verifies that the copy or move operation doesn’t affect the private directory of the app, by initializing a file object using the incoming string as an argument to the File class constructor and comparing its canonical path with the path that corresponds to the home directory of the application (steps 3 and 4). Given a content URI as a path, the File constructor normalizes it (following a Unix file system normalization), thus the getCanonicalPath method returns a string starting with “/content:/“, which will always pass the validity check. More specifically, the app performs a query to the remote content provider for the _size, _display_name and _data columns (see line 48 below). Then it uses the values returned by these rows to initialize the fields of an object of the com.android.fileexplorer.mode.c class:

Figure 8. Getting file metadata from the remote content provider

Given the case that the _display_name and _data values, returned from the external file provider, are relative paths to the destination directory, after exiting from the method above, these class fields will contain values like the ones depicted below:

Figure 9. The file model initialized after calling the method a

As shown above, the paths (variables d and e) of this file-model point to files within the home directory of the application, thus the file streams attached to the incoming intent are going to be written under the specific locations.

Getting code execution

As previously mentioned, the application uses a plugin to clean the device’s junk files:

Figure 10. The junk files cleaner plugin user interface

When the application loads this plugin, it makes use of two native libraries: libixiaomifileu.so, which fetches from the /data/app directory, and libixiaomifileuext.so from the home directory:

Figure 11. Tracing the loaded native libraries using medusa

As apps don’t have write access to the /data/app folder, the libixiaomifileu.so file stored there cannot be replaced. The easiest way to get code execution is to replace the libixiaomifileuext.so with a malicious one. However, an attempt to do so would fail since in this particular case, the vulnerability that we described can only be used to write new files within the home directory, not overwrite existing files. Our next inquiry was to determine how the application loads the libixiaomifileu.so.

Our assessment showed that before the application loads this library, it follows the following steps:

1. Calculate the hash of the file libixiaomifileu.so, located in the /data/app directory

2. Compare this hash with the value assigned to the “libixiaomifileu.so_hm5” string, fetched from the com.mi.android.globalFileexprorer_preferences.xml file

Figure 12. the com.mi.android.globalFileexprorer_preferences.xml

3. If the values don’t match, search for the libixiaomifileu.so file in the /files/lib path in the home directory

4. If the file is found there, calculate its hash and compare it again with the value from the shared_preferences folder

5. If the hashes match, load the file under the /files/lib using the System.load method

Given this behavior, in order to get code execution with the file manager’s user ID, an attacker must take the following steps:

1. Use the path traversal vulnerability to save a malicious library as /files/lib/libixiaomifileu.so (the file does not already exist in that directory, so overwriting is not an issue)

2. Calculate the hash of this library to replace the value of the libixiaomifileu.so_hm5 string

3. Trigger the junk cleaner plugin with an explicit intent, since the activity that loads the native libraries is exported

An acute reader might have noticed that the second step requires the attacker to force the browser to overwrite the com.mi.android.globalFileexprorer_preferences.xml, which, as we already mentioned, was not possible.

To overcome this restriction, we referred to the actual implementation of the SharedPreferences class, where we found that when an Android application uses the getSharedPreferences API method to retrieve an instance of the SharedPreferences class, giving the name of the shared preferences file as an argument, then the constructor of the SharedPreferencesImpl class performs the following steps:

1. Create a new file object using the name provided to the getSharedPreferences method, followed by the .xml extension, followed by the .bak extension

2. Check if this file exists, and in case it does, delete the original xml file and replace it with the one created in the first step

Through this behavior, we were able to save the com.mi.android.globalFileexprorer_preferences.xml.bak under the shared preferences folder (as during the application’s runtime it is unlikely to exist), so when the app tried to verify the hash, the original xml file was already replaced by our own copy. After this point, by using a single intent to start the junk cleaner plugin, we were able to trick the application to load the malicious library instead of the one under the /data/app folder and get code execution with the browser’s user ID.

Impact

One reason we chose to use this app as a showcase is because the impact extends beyond the user’s mobile device. The application gives the option to connect to remote file shares using the FTP and SMB protocols and the user credentials are saved in clear text in the /data/data/com.mi.android.globalFileexplorer/files/rmt_i.properties file:

Figure 13. SMB/FTP credentials saved in clear text

If a third party app was able to exploit this vulnerability and obtain code execution, an attacker could retrieve these credentials. The impact would then extend even further, since by the time that a user requests to open a remote share, the browser creates the directory /sdcard/Android/data/com.mi.android.globalFileexplorer/files/usbTemp/ where it saves the files that the user retrieves:

Figure 14. SMB shared files, saved in the external storage

This means that a remote attacker would be able to read or write files to SMB shares of a local network, assuming that the device was connected to it. The same stands for FTP shares as they are handled exactly in the same way:

Figure 15. FTP shared files, saved in the external storage

In summary, the exploitation flow is depicted in the figure below:

Figure 16. Getting remote access to local shares

In step 1, the user opens a malicious app that may pose as a file editor, messaging app, mail client, or any app in general and request the user to save a file. By the time that the user attempts to save such a file, no matter what destination path they choose to save it, the malicious app forces the file browser app to write it under its internal /files/lib folder. Then, the malicious app can start the junk cleaner using an explicit intent (no user interaction is required) and this will lead to code execution with the browser’s ID (step 2).

In step 3, the attacker uses the arbitrary code execution capability to retrieve the SMB and FTP credentials from the rmt_i.properties file. Subsequently, the attacker can now jump to step 5 and access the shares directly using the stolen credentials. Alternatively, after retrieving the share credentials, the mobile device can connect to a local network (step 4) and access an SMB or FTP share, allowing the attacker to access the shared files through the /sdcard/Android/data/com.mi.android.globalFileexplorer/files/usbTemp/ folder (step 5).

Recommendations

Recognizing that this vulnerability pattern may be widespread, we shared our findings with Google’s Android Application Security Research team. We collaborated with Google to author guidance for Android application developers to help them recognize and avoid this pattern. We recommend developers and security analysts familiarize themselves with the excellent Android application security guidance provided by Google as well as make use of the Android Lint tool included with the Android SDK and integrated with Android Studio (supplemented with Google’s additional security-focused checks) to identify and avoid potential vulnerabilities. GitHub’s CodeQL also provides capabilities to identify vulnerabilities.

To prevent these issues, when handling file streams sent by other applications, the safest solution is to completely ignore the name returned by the remote file provider when caching the received content. Some of the most robust approaches we encountered use randomly generated names, so even in the case that the content of an incoming stream is malformed, it won’t tamper with the application.

In cases where such an approach is not feasible, developers need to take extra steps to ascertain that the cached file is written to a dedicated directory. As an incoming file stream is usually identified by a content URI, the first step is to reliably identify and sanitize the corresponding filename. Besides filtering characters that may lead to a path traversal and before performing any write operation, developers must verify that the cached file is within the dedicated directory by performing a call to the File.getCanonicalPath and validating the prefix of the returned value.

Another area to safeguard is in the way developers try to extract a filename from a content URI. Developers often use Uri.getLastPathSegment(), which returns the (URL) decoded value of the last path URI segment. An attacker can craft a URI with URL encoded characters within this segment, including characters used for path traversal. Using the returned value to cache a file can again render the application vulnerable to this type of attack.

For end users, we recommend keeping mobile applications up to date through the Google Play Store (or other appropriate trusted source) to ensure that updates addressing known vulnerabilities are installed. Users should only install applications from trusted sources to avoid potentially malicious applications. We recommend users who accessed SMB or FTP shares through the Xiaomi app before updates to reset credentials and to investigate for any anomalous behavior. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint on Android can alert users and enterprises to malicious applications, and Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management can identify installed applications with known vulnerabilities.

Dimitrios Valsamaras

Microsoft Threat Intelligence

References

• https://www.blackhat.com/asia-23/briefings/schedule/index.html#dirty-stream-attack-turning-android-share-targets-into-attack-vectors-30234
• https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/risks/untrustworthy-contentprovider-provided-filename
• https://developer.android.com/reference/androidx/core/content/FileProvider
• https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/provider-element#gprmsn
• https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.mi.android.globalFileexplorer
• https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=cn.wps.moffice_eng
• https://googlesamples.github.io/android-custom-lint-rules/checks/UnsafeDynamicallyLoadedCode.md.html
• https://androidrank.org/application/file_manager/com.mi.android.globalFileexplorer
• https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/+/master:frameworks/base/core/java/android/app/SharedPreferencesImpl.java;l=150
• https://developer.android.com/privacy-and-security/risks
• https://developer.android.com/studio/write/lint#gradle
• https://github.com/google/android-security-lints/
• https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/java/

Learn more

For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog: https://aka.ms/threatintelblog.

To get notified about new publications and to join discussions on social media, follow us on LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/showcase/microsoft-threat-intelligence, and on X (formerly Twitter) at https://twitter.com/MsftSecIntel.

To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast: https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/microsoft-threat-intelligence.

The post “Dirty stream” attack: Discovering and mitigating a common vulnerability pattern in Android apps appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

The post ​​Investigating industrial control systems using Microsoft’s ICSpector open-source framework appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

The cloud security market continues to evolve, reflecting the diligent efforts of security professionals globally. They are at the forefront of developing innovative solutions and strategies to address the sophisticated tactics of cyberattackers. The necessity for these solutions to stay ahead of potential exploitation methods is clear. One notable advancement in this ongoing effort is the emergence of the cloud-native application protection platform, or CNAPP. In Microsoft’s guide “From plan to deployment: implementing a cloud-native application protection platform (CNAPP) strategy,” we explore all the aspects of this emerging trend, what it can mean for your organization, and how to get started.

CNAPP combines several cybersecurity capabilities—cloud security posture management (CSPM), cloud infrastructure entitlement management (CIEM), and cloud workload protection (CWP), among others—into one platform. This platform protects your organization through every operation, from concept development to runtime use. And it’s tailored to applications native to a multicloud environment. As a result, you can both ensure management access and strengthen app-related defenses against potential vulnerabilities in multicloud setups.

Choosing CNAPP as your solution can help chief information security officers (CISOs) build impact.1 When weighing the value of CNAPP, consider these numbers:

• 40% of organizations used a CNAPP in 2023 and an additional 45% expect to use one by the end of 2024.2
• 87% of organizations embrace multicloud.3
• 82% of breaches involved data stored in the cloud.4
• $4.45 million is the average cost of a data breach.5
• 54% of organizations do not include security in the development phase.6

Read on for five of the biggest insights found in the guide and download “From plan to deployment: implementing a cloud-native application protection platform (CNAPP) strategy” to dive deeper into this important subject. Use it as a valuable resource to guide your CNAPP planning.

Implementing a CNAPP strategy

Learn how a cloud-native application protection platform can strengthen your organization's security strategy.

Get the guide Insight #1: AI can tighten security and deliver insights

AI and machine learning play key roles in threat mitigation and security operations for cloud security. In fact, they could even be considered the backbone of these strategies because they give you the ability to analyze and respond to threats in real-time. Seconds matter in cybersecurity and could be the difference between minimal and major damage from a cyberattack.

AI and machine learning can also provide an assist by increasing predictive analysis and automating security tasks, helping your employees prioritize strategic security tasks. Manually managing today’s complex cloud infrastructures simply isn’t possible. The key is to include human oversight with human-in-the-loop monitoring of the technologies.

Insight #2: CNAPP can address challenges like alert overload and more

CNAPP holds day-to-day ease for security teams and strategic value for decision-makers. And there’s an urgent need for an end-to-end platform for cloud security—even better if powered by AI and machine learning. CNAPP helps you address some of the biggest challenges in cloud security, including:

• Building security into software during development: Security as code, which involves building security into software during development, will keep gaining momentum. CNAPP benefits the development process in several ways, including ensuring security is part of application development and forging collaboration between the developers and security teams.  
• Improving multicloud security posture: With CNAPP solutions, you can get an aggregation and analysis of data from multiple cloud platforms and services in a unified dashboard. These centralized insights can help security teams prioritize tasks more easily. Expanding multicloud visibility and enhancing multiplatform protection are two advantages of recent Microsoft Security innovations.
• Decreasing costs and tackling advanced cyberthreats: Security operations center (SOC) analysts and security admins could be easily overwhelmed by the modern digital threat landscape and frustrated by the number of signals. The predictive analytics of CNAPP solutions can make it easier for them to identify and mitigate potential risks while automating security responses to threats.

Insight #3: Effective cybersecurity takes a good partner  

The next wave of multicloud security with Microsoft Defender for Cloud

Read more

Keeping user needs in mind, Microsoft has its own CNAPP solution—Microsoft Defender for Cloud. This comprehensive security solution has robust security features to safeguard a wide array of resources, including servers, containers, databases, applications, and, crucially, data storage solutions like Microsoft Azure Storage, across various cloud platforms. Implementing Microsoft Defender for Cloud can protect against current threats and position your organization to confidently address emerging security threats in the cloud.

Cybersecurity is a dual effort between cloud service providers and users. Microsoft Defender for Cloud models this collaborative approach with a more integrated and proactive strategy than is common with traditional security. Among other attributes, it aligns with DevOps, features rapid deployment capabilities, and offers two levels of CSPM functionality—foundational and premium from an offering called Microsoft Defender Cloud Security Posture Management. Deploying CSPM services should be a part of your CNAPP strategy.

It also integrates with other cybersecurity solutions. But given the way Microsoft embraces innovation, it’s probably no surprise that we’ll continue to evolve this solution to keep pace with fluid technological advancement. So, as usual, watch this space for exciting announcements to come.

Insight #4: Operationalizing CNAPP is a multipronged approach

With any solution, the benefits can’t be realized if your users aren’t adopting it. Operationalizing Microsoft Defender for Cloud takes both integrating it into daily operations and satisfying your users’ needs by continuously evolving cloud security. You want your users to manage it and use the platform’s capabilities. This includes its functionalities across Microsoft Azure, Amazon Web Services, and Google Cloud Platform.

Other factors of operationalizing CNAPP include:

• Monitoring continuously, evaluating risk, and assessing status.
• Managing identity entitlement.
• Training employees to use security tools.
• Setting processes in place that can mitigate and remediate unhealthy resources.
• Fostering a culture of security awareness.

Insight #5: CNAPP is a critical part of a modern SOC

The SOC is critical and you strive for it to be efficient and effective. The insights from a CNAPP like Microsoft Defender for Cloud can dramatically transform SOC operations due to its total visibility, real-time monitoring, compliance and risk management tools, multiple integrations, and advanced analytics.

You can take a more proactive, strategic approach to cloud security with capabilities like:

• Detailed insights into threats and vulnerabilities, including their possible severity and impact.
• Automated compliance assessments based on industry standards.
• Post-incident analysis support through incident information.

Strengthening the SOC even further is a new Microsoft Defender for Cloud integration with Microsoft Defender XDR. You gain access to Defender for Cloud alerts and incidents within the Microsoft Defender portal for richer investigation context.

These highlights are just the beginning of what you can accomplish with CNAPP.

Explore the future of CNAPP and cloud security

Building a secure-first organization is critical to counter the continual stream of cyberthreats and the increasingly sophisticated nature of them. The future holds significant promise for CNAPP, and Microsoft is leading in this effort with solutions like Microsoft Defender for Cloud. Get details on CNAPP use case scenarios and Defender for Cloud’s integrations with other Microsoft products—and strategies for adopting and operationalizing it—in our guide “From plan to deployment: implementing a cloud-native application protection platform (CNAPP) strategy.” Or, watch our podcast for an expert discussion on how CNAPP helps you address modern challenges. Learn more about how Defender for Cloud can help you protect your multicloud resources, workloads, and apps.

Learn more

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

1Want to build impact as a CISO? Choose CNAPP as your solution, CSO. May 26, 2024. 

2The future of cloud security: Top trends to watch in 2024, InfoWorld. March 14, 2024. 

32023 State of the Cloud Report, Flexera.

4Microsoft Enterprise DevOps Report. 

5Cost of a Data Breach Report, IBM. 2023. 

6Microsoft Cloud Security Priorities and Practices Research. 

The post 5 ways a CNAPP can strengthen your multicloud security environment appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

There’s an increasing demand for skilled cybersecurity professionals. It’s being driven by a surge in cyberthreats and more sophisticated attackers. However, many employers are hesitant to fill open cybersecurity roles and are hiring conservatively in case of economic downturn—even though they understand the importance of having the right expertise to mitigate contemporary cyberrisks.

Organizations face an increasingly complex cybersecurity landscape. The cybersecurity workforce growth rate lags behind the necessary 12.6% annual expansion to effectively counter cyberthreats, only achieving an 8.7% increase. This shortfall leaves a gap of approximately 4 million professionals worldwide. Amidst this challenge, companies navigate layoffs, budget cuts, and hiring freezes with expectations of further economic tightening in 2024.1

Windows Internals Book

Learn more

Yet cybersecurity expertise is crucial, especially when dealing with complex issues like analyzing Windows Internals during forensic investigations—a task that requires deep technical knowledge to interpret various artifacts and timestamps accurately. To help like-minded defenders tackle this difficult task, Microsoft Incident Response experts have created a guide on using Windows Internals for forensic investigations.

Guidance for Incident Responders

The new guide from the Microsoft Incident Response team helps simplify forensic investigations.

Get the guide Microsoft Incident Response guide highlights

Our guide serves as an essential resource, meticulously structured to illuminate commonly seen, but not commonly understood, Windows Internals features in forensic investigations. Understanding these artifacts will strengthen your ability to conduct Windows forensic analysis. Equipped with this information and your new findings, you’ll be able to construct more complete timelines of activity. It includes the following topics:

• AmCache’s contribution to forensic investigations: The AmCache registry hive’s role in storing information about executed and installed applications is crucial, yet it’s often mistakenly believed to capture every execution event. This misunderstanding can lead to significant gaps in forensic narratives, particularly where malware employs evasion techniques. Moreover, the lack of execution timestamp specificity in AmCache data further complicates accurate timeline reconstruction.
• Browser forensics: Uncovering digital behaviors: The comprehensive analysis of browser artifacts is fraught with challenges, particularly regarding the interpretation of local file access records. The misconception that browsers do not track local file access can lead to significant oversight in understanding user behavior, underscoring the need for thorough and nuanced analysis of browser data.
• The role of Link files and Jump Lists in forensics: Link, or LNK, files and Jump Lists are pivotal for documenting user behaviors. However, investigators sometimes neglect the fact that they’re prone to manipulation or deletion by users or malware. This oversight can lead to flawed conclusions. Furthermore, Windows’ automatic maintenance tasks, which can alter or delete these artifacts, add another layer of complexity to their analysis.
• Prefetch files and program execution: Prefetch files’ role in improving application launch times and their forensic value in tracking application usage is well-documented. However, the common error of conflating the prefetch file’s creation date with the last execution date of an application leads to mistaken conclusions about usage patterns. Also, overlooking the aggregation of data from multiple prefetch files can result in a fragmented understanding of application interactions over time.
• ShellBags forensic analysis: ShellBags, with their ability to record user interactions with the File Explorer environment, offer a rich source of information. Yet not all investigators recognize that ShellBags track deleted and moved folders, in addition to current ones. This oversight can lead to incomplete reconstructions of user activities.
• Shimcache’s forensic evolution: The Shimcache has long served as a source of forensic information, particularly as evidence of program execution. However, the changes in Windows 10 and later have significantly impacted the forensic meaning of Shimcache artifacts: indicating file presence, and not indicating execution. This misunderstanding can mislead investigators, especially since Shimcache logs the last modification timestamp, not execution time, and data is only committed to disk upon shutdown or reboot.
• Forensic insights with SRUM: SRUM’s tracking of application execution, network activity, and resource consumption is a boon for forensic analysts. However, the wealth of data can also be overwhelming, leading to crucial details being missed or misinterpreted. For instance, the temporal discrepancies between the SRUM database and system logs can confuse investigators, making it challenging to align activities accurately. Additionally, the finite storage of SRUM data means older information can be overwritten without notice, a fact that’s often overlooked, resulting in gaps in data analysis.
• The importance of User Access Logging (UAL): UAL’s tracking of user activities based on roles and access origins is essential for security analysis, especially since this feature is designed for Windows Server operating systems (specifically 2012 and later). Its vast data volume can be daunting, leading to potential oversight of unusual access patterns or lateral movements. Additionally, the annual archiving system of UAL data can cause confusion regarding the longevity and accessibility of logs, impacting long-term forensic investigations.
• Decoding UserAssist for forensic evidence: The UserAssist feature’s tracking of GUI-based program interactions is often misunderstood, with analysts mistakenly prioritizing run counts over focus time. This misstep can lead to inaccurate assumptions about application usage, as focus time—a more reliable indicator of execution—gets overlooked.

Why read this guide today

Bridging the gap between gaining insights from the Microsoft Incident Response team and the practical application of these strategies within your own organization underscores a journey from knowledge acquisition to operational implementation. By downloading the guide, you’re not just accessing a wealth of expert strategies, you’re initiating a critical shift towards a more resilient cybersecurity posture. This transition naturally leads to the understanding that while the right tools and strategies are vital, the true essence of cybersecurity lies in the practice and adoption of a security-minded culture within your organization.

To learn more about Microsoft Security solutions, visit our website. Bookmark the Security blog to keep up with our expert coverage on security matters. Also, follow us on LinkedIn (Microsoft Security) and X (@MSFTSecurity) for the latest news and updates on cybersecurity.

1How the Economy, Skills Gap and Artificial Intelligence are Challenging the Global Cybersecurity Workforce, ISC2. 2023.

The post New Microsoft Incident Response guide helps simplify cyberthreat investigations appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence is publishing results of our longstanding investigation into activity by the Russian-based threat actor Forest Blizzard (STRONTIUM) using a custom tool to elevate privileges and steal credentials in compromised networks. Since at least June 2020 and possibly as early as April 2019, Forest Blizzard has used the tool, which we refer to as GooseEgg, to exploit the CVE-2022-38028 vulnerability in Windows Print Spooler service by modifying a JavaScript constraints file and executing it with SYSTEM-level permissions. Microsoft has observed Forest Blizzard using GooseEgg as part of post-compromise activities against targets including Ukrainian, Western European, and North American government, non-governmental, education, and transportation sector organizations. While a simple launcher application, GooseEgg is capable of spawning other applications specified at the command line with elevated permissions, allowing threat actors to support any follow-on objectives such as remote code execution, installing a backdoor, and moving laterally through compromised networks.

Forest Blizzard often uses publicly available exploits in addition to CVE-2022-38028, such as CVE-2023-23397. Linked to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) by the United States and United Kingdom governments, Forest Blizzard primarily focuses on strategic intelligence targets and differs from other GRU-affiliated and sponsored groups, which Microsoft has tied to destructive attacks, such as Seashell Blizzard (IRIDIUM) and Cadet Blizzard (DEV-0586). Although Russian threat actors are known to have exploited a set of similar vulnerabilities known as PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527 and CVE-2021-1675), the use of GooseEgg in Forest Blizzard operations is a unique discovery that had not been previously reported by security providers. Microsoft is committed to providing visibility into observed malicious activity and sharing insights on threat actors to help organizations protect themselves. Organizations and users are to apply the CVE-2022-38028 security update to mitigate this threat, while Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects the specific Forest Blizzard capability as HackTool:Win64/GooseEgg.

This blog provides technical information on GooseEgg, a unique Forest Blizzard capability. In addition to patching, this blog details several steps users can take to defend themselves against attempts to exploit Print Spooler vulnerabilities. We also provide additional recommendations, detections, and indicators of compromise. As with any observed nation-state actor activity, Microsoft directly notifies customers that have been targeted or compromised, providing them with the necessary information to secure their accounts.

Who is Forest Blizzard?

Forest Blizzard primarily targets government, energy, transportation, and non-governmental organizations in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Microsoft has also observed Forest Blizzard targeting media, information technology, sports organizations, and educational institutions worldwide. Since at least 2010, the threat actor’s primary mission has been to collect intelligence in support of Russian government foreign policy initiatives. The United States and United Kingdom governments have linked Forest Blizzard to Unit 26165 of the Russian Federation’s military intelligence agency, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). Other security researchers have used GRU Unit 26165, APT28, Sednit, Sofacy, and Fancy Bear to refer to groups with similar or related activities.

GooseEgg

Microsoft Threat Intelligence assesses Forest Blizzard’s objective in deploying GooseEgg is to gain elevated access to target systems and steal credentials and information. While this actor’s TTPs and infrastructure specific to the use of this tool can change at any time, the following sections provide additional details on Forest Blizzard tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in past compromises.

Launch, persistence, and privilege escalation

Microsoft has observed that, after obtaining access to a target device, Forest Blizzard uses GooseEgg to elevate privileges within the environment. GooseEgg is typically deployed with a batch script, which we have observed using the name execute.bat and doit.bat. This batch script writes the file servtask.bat, which contains commands for saving off/compressing registry hives. The batch script invokes the paired GooseEgg executable and sets up persistence as a scheduled task designed to run servtask.bat.

Figure 1. Batch file

The GooseEgg binary—which has included but is not limited to the file names justice.exe and DefragmentSrv.exe—takes one of four commands, each with different run paths. While the binary appears to launch a trivial given command, in fact the binary does this in a unique and sophisticated manner, likely to help conceal the activity.

The first command issues a custom return code 0x6009F49F and exits; which could be indicative of a version number. The next two commands trigger the exploit and launch either a provided dynamic-link library (DLL) or executable with elevated permissions. The fourth and final command tests the exploit and checks that it has succeeded using the whoami command.

Microsoft has observed that the name of an embedded malicious DLL file typically includes the phrase “wayzgoose”; for example, wayzgoose23.dll. This DLL, as well as other components of the malware, are deployed to one of the following installation subdirectories, which is created under C:\ProgramData. A subdirectory name is selected from the list below:

• Microsoft
• Adobe
• Comms
• Intel
• Kaspersky Lab
• Bitdefender
• ESET
• NVIDIA
• UbiSoft
• Steam

A specially crafted subdirectory with randomly generated numbers and the format string \v%u.%02u.%04u is also created and serves as the install directory. For example, a directory that looks like C:\ProgramData\Adobe\v2.116.4405 may be created. The binary then copies the following driver stores to this directory:

• C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\pnms003.inf_*
• C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\pnms009.inf_*

Figure 2. GooseEgg binary adding driver stores to an actor-controlled directory

Next, registry keys are created, effectively generating a custom protocol handler and registering a new CLSID to serve as the COM server for this “rogue” protocol. The exploit replaces the C: drive symbolic link in the object manager to point to the newly created directory. When the PrintSpooler attempts to load C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\pnms009.inf_amd64_a7412a554c9bc1fd\MPDW-Constraints.js, it instead is redirected to the actor-controlled directory containing the copied driver packages.

Figure 3. Registry key creation Figure 4. C: drive symbolic link hijack

The “MPDW-constraints.js” stored within the actor-controlled directory has the following patch applied to the convertDevModeToPrintTicket function:

function convertDevModeToPrintTicket(devModeProperties, scriptContext, printTicket) {try{ printTicket.XmlNode.load('rogue9471://go'); } catch (e) {}

The above patch to the convertDevModeToPrintTicket function invokes the “rogue” search protocol handler’s CLSID during the call to RpcEndDocPrinter. This results in the auxiliary DLL wayzgoose.dll launching in the context of the PrintSpooler service with SYSTEM permissions. wayzgoose.dll is a basic launcher application capable of spawning other applications specified at the command line with SYSTEM-level permissions, enabling threat actors to perform other malicious activities such as installing a backdoor, moving laterally through compromised networks, and remotely executing code.

Recommendations

Microsoft recommends the following mitigations defend against attacks that use GooseEgg.

Reduce the Print Spooler vulnerability

Microsoft released a security update for the Print Spooler vulnerability exploited by GooseEgg on October 11, 2022 and updates for PrintNightmare vulnerabilities on June 8, 2021 and July 1, 2021. Customers who have not implemented these fixes yet are urged to do so as soon as possible for their organization’s security. In addition, since the Print Spooler service isn’t required for domain controller operations, Microsoft recommends disabling the service on domain controllers. Otherwise, users can install available Windows security updates for Print Spooler vulnerabilities on Windows domain controllers before member servers and workstations. To help identify domain controllers that have the Print Spooler service enabled, Microsoft Defender for Identity has a built-in security assessment that tracks the availability of Print Spooler services on domain controllers.

Be proactively defensive

• For customers, follow the credential hardening recommendations in our on-premises credential theft overview to defend against common credential theft techniques like LSASS access.
• Run Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) in block mode so that Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can block malicious artifacts, even when your non-Microsoft antivirus does not detect the threat or when Microsoft Defender Antivirus is running in passive mode. EDR in block mode works behind the scenes to remediate malicious artifacts that are detected post-breach.    
• Configure investigation and remediation in full automated mode to let Microsoft Defender for Endpoint take immediate action on alerts to resolve breaches, significantly reducing alert volume. 
• Turn on cloud-delivered protection in Microsoft Defender Antivirus, or the equivalent for your antivirus product, to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block a majority of new and unknown variants.

Microsoft Defender XDR customers can turn on the following attack surface reduction rule to prevent common attack techniques used for GooseEgg. Microsoft Defender XDR detects the GooseEgg tool and raises an alert upon detection of attempts to exploit Print Spooler vulnerabilities regardless of whether the device has been patched.

•  Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)

Detecting, hunting, and responding to GooseEgg Microsoft Defender XDR detections

Microsoft Defender Antivirus

Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects threat components as the following malware:

• HackTool:Win64/GooseEgg

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint

The following alerts might also indicate threat activity related to this threat. Note, however, that these alerts can be also triggered by unrelated threat activity.

• Possible exploitation of CVE-2021-34527
• Possible source of PrintNightmare exploitation
• Possible target of PrintNightmare exploitation attempt
• Potential elevation of privilege using print filter pipeline service
• Suspicious behavior by spoolsv.exe
• Forest Blizzard Actor activity detected

Microsoft Defender for Identity

The following alerts might also indicate threat activity related to this threat. Note, however, that these alerts can be also triggered by unrelated threat activity.

• Suspected Windows Print Spooler service exploitation attempt (CVE-2021-34527 exploitation)

Threat intelligence reports

Microsoft customers can use the following reports in Microsoft products to get the most up-to-date information about the threat actor, malicious activity, and techniques discussed in this blog. These reports provide the intelligence, protection information, and recommended actions to prevent, mitigate, or respond to associated threats found in customer environments.

Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence

• Actor Profile: Forest Blizzard
• Abuse of Windows Print Spooler for privilege escalation and persistence

Hunting queries

Microsoft Sentinel

Microsoft Sentinel customers can use the TI Mapping analytics (a series of analytics all prefixed with ‘TI map’) to automatically match the malicious domain indicators mentioned in this blog post with data in their workspace. If the TI Map analytics are not currently deployed, customers can install the Threat Intelligence solution from the Microsoft Sentinel Content Hub to have the analytics rule deployed in their Sentinel workspace. More details on the Content Hub can be found here:  https://learn.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/sentinel-solutions-deploy.

Hunt for filenames, file extensions in ProgramData folder and file hash

let filenames = dynamic(["execute.bat","doit.bat","servtask.bat"]); DeviceFileEvents | where TimeGenerated > ago(60d) // change the duration according to your requirement | where ActionType == "FileCreated" | where FolderPath == "C:\\ProgramData\\" | where FileName in~ (filenames) or FileName endswith ".save" or FileName endswith ".zip" or ( FileName startswith "wayzgoose" and FileName endswith ".dll") or SHA256 == "7d51e5cc51c43da5deae5fbc2dce9b85c0656c465bb25ab6bd063a503c1806a9" // hash value of execute.bat/doit.bat/servtask.bat | project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName,InitiatingProcessAccountUpn

Hunt for processes creating scheduled task creation

DeviceProcessEvents | where TimeGenerated > ago(60d) // change the duration according to your requirement | where InitiatingProcessSHA256 == "6b311c0a977d21e772ac4e99762234da852bbf84293386fbe78622a96c0b052f" or SHA256 == "6b311c0a977d21e772ac4e99762234da852bbf84293386fbe78622a96c0b052f" //hash value of justice.exe | where InitiatingProcessSHA256 == "c60ead92cd376b689d1b4450f2578b36ea0bf64f3963cfa5546279fa4424c2a5" or SHA256 == "c60ead92cd376b689d1b4450f2578b36ea0bf64f3963cfa5546279fa4424c2a5" //hash value of DefragmentSrv.exe or ProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks /Create /RU SYSTEM /TN \\Microsoft\\Windows\\WinSrv /TR C:\\ProgramData\\servtask.bat /SC MINUTE" or ProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks /Create /RU SYSTEM /TN \\Microsoft\\Windows\\WinSrv /TR C:\\ProgramData\\execute.bat /SC MINUTE" or ProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks /Create /RU SYSTEM /TN \\Microsoft\\Windows\\WinSrv /TR C:\\ProgramData\\doit.bat /SC MINUTE" or ProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks /DELETE /F /TN \\Microsoft\\Windows\\WinSrv" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks /Create /RU SYSTEM /TN \\Microsoft\\Windows\\WinSrv /TR C:\\ProgramData\\servtask.bat /SC MINUTE" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks /Create /RU SYSTEM /TN \\Microsoft\\Windows\\WinSrv /TR C:\\ProgramData\\execute.bat /SC MINUTE" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks /Create /RU SYSTEM /TN \\Microsoft\\Windows\\WinSrv /TR C:\\ProgramData\\doit.bat /SC MINUTE" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "schtasks /DELETE /F /TN \\Microsoft\\Windows\\WinSrv" | project TimeGenerated, AccountName,AccountUpn,ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName,FolderPath, FileName

Hunt for JavaScript constrained file

DeviceFileEvents | where TimeGenerated > ago(60d) // change the duration according to your requirement | where ActionType == "FileCreated" | where FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\" | where FileName endswith ".js" or FileName == "MPDW-constraints.js"

Hunt for creation of registry key / value events

DeviceRegistryEvents | where TimeGenerated > ago(60d) // change the duration according to your requirement | where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet" | where RegistryKey contains "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{026CC6D7-34B2-33D5-B551-CA31EB6CE345}\\Server" | where RegistryValueName has "(Default)" | where RegistryValueData has "wayzgoose.dll" or RegistryValueData contains ".dll"

 Hunt for custom protocol handler

DeviceRegistryEvents | where TimeGenerated > ago(60d) // change the duration according to your requirement | where ActionType == "RegistryValueSet" | where RegistryKey contains "HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Classes\\PROTOCOLS\\Handler\\rogue" | where RegistryValueName has "CLSID" | where RegistryValueData contains "{026CC6D7-34B2-33D5-B551-CA31EB6CE345}" Indicators of compromise

Batch script artifacts:

• execute.bat
• doit.bat
• servtask.bat
• 7d51e5cc51c43da5deae5fbc2dce9b85c0656c465bb25ab6bd063a503c1806a9

GooseEgg artifacts:

• justice.pdb
• wayzgoose.pdb

IndicatorTypeDescriptionc60ead92cd376b689d1b4450f2578b36ea0bf64f3963cfa5546279fa4424c2a5SHA-256Hash of GooseEgg binary DefragmentSrv.exe6b311c0a977d21e772ac4e99762234da852bbf84293386fbe78622a96c0b052fSHA-256Hash of GooseEgg binary justice.exe41a9784f8787ed86f1e5d20f9895059dac7a030d8d6e426b9ddcaf547c3393aaSHA-256Hash of wayzgoose[%n].dll – where %n is a random number References

• https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF
• https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-34527
• https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-1675
• https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-074a

Learn more

For the latest security research from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community, check out the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Blog: https://aka.ms/threatintelblog.

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To hear stories and insights from the Microsoft Threat Intelligence community about the ever-evolving threat landscape, listen to the Microsoft Threat Intelligence podcast: https://thecyberwire.com/podcasts/microsoft-threat-intelligence.

The post Analyzing Forest Blizzard’s custom post-compromise tool for exploiting CVE-2022-38028 to obtain credentials appeared first on Microsoft Security Blog.